I INTRODUCTION
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Salduz v Turkey 1 has led to considerable reforms of custodial interrogation regimes in many European countries. 2 In France, it paved the way for the introduction of legislation -the Law of an inquisitorial phase of the criminal process in France provides the background against which the two notions central to this article -legal cosmopolitanism and local resistance -will be investigated. The concept of legal cosmopolitanism is flexible and elusive. 12 For the purposes of the inquiries that follow, it will be perceived as a modern phenomenon that is 'exemplified by the conjunction of an increasingly robust international human rights law … with the rapid evolution of transnational criminal justice policy making', 13 the unprecedented proliferation of international criminal courts and the emergence of a dialogue between supreme court judges and other leading members of the legal community in different legal systems. 14 Now attesting to such a cosmopolitan character of modern legal systems is rapidly becoming cliché. National law is seen as interacting with foreign law more frequently than ever before 15 and as being shaped under international and transnational law influences that are so dynamic as to call into question the 'capacities, competencies and legitimation claims of the nation state itself', 16 to the extent that 'justice can no longer be seen as a purely local phenomenon'. 17 Traditions and legal orders are observed as opening to each other, living in each other's midst, in ways that allegedly strongly resonate with the cosmopolitan vision of Kant and Derrida. 18 'Law is thus [conceived as being] open to the world', 19 making redundant 'a static conception of laws in favor of a vision decidedly evolutionary'. 20 We are even beginning to look for signs of emerging unified legal cultures, for example 'a European legal culture, distinct from preexisting national traditions', 21 and we have already envisioned the creation of a 'global legal culture'. 22 The question then arises on how, in a time of cosmopolitan law, phenomena unveiling the isolationism and exceptionalism of a particular legal system ought to be interpreted.
The starting point for this line of inquiry will be the observation that until the April 2011 reform suspects in France were deprived of two of the most commonly cited procedural rights applying to custodial interrogation -legal assistance and notification of the right to silence -, in stark contrast to foreign and international law. This insular approach sits uneasily with a view of the French legal system as cosmopolitan. A cosmopolitan legal system is arguably characterized by 'breadth of vision' and 'freedom from parochial limitations and attachments', 23 as evidenced, in particular, by its willingness and capacity to interact with foreign and international law, 'to open a dialogue with laws and legal practices developed outside [its] jurisdictional confines in [an] effort to draw inspiration from them'. 24 Conversely, a legal system where national solutions are disconnected from those presented by foreign and international law, and which 'closes itself off in a particularistic fashion', to borrow a phrase from Habermas, 25 cannot make a valid claim to having a cosmopolitan vision. From this angle, the observation about pre-April 14 th isolationism lends itself to the interpretation that when one moves from rough generalizations to specific contextual inquiries, a more nuanced picture of modern legal systems' cosmopolitan tendencies may emerge, hence the need for contextual inquiries that can shed light on the complex relationship between the cosmopolitan attitudes inherent in international and comparative law's growing influence and the provincial attitudes that the same external influences may generate.
At the same time, with the Law of April 14 th , the transition from an out-ofsync position to a sudden realignment with the international community is of particular value when extrapolating French criminal procedure's cosmopolitan character, or lack thereof, from its approach to the two rights examined here. This is particularly so given the unquestionable impact of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on this transitional process, which can be deciphered as a clear sign of cosmopolitan tendencies manifesting themselves. It is equally intriguing to observe how the impact of external cosmopolitan influences fluctuates depending on the institution that is at the receiving end. The judiciary has been quick to translate these external influences into a true driving force for reform. The executive and the legislature have received the same influences with much less enthusiasm, which resulted in often undercurrent yet strongly felt forces of local resistance distorting the adversarial vision of the reform.
This sharp contrast between legal cosmopolitanism and local resistance, as opposite forces shaping law reform, will form the backbone of my argument. Put another way, my inquiries will be situated within the context of two conflicting trends, insightfully described by the former First President of the Cour de cassation (Supreme Court of France), Guy Canivet: 'the incommensurability -irreducibility of legal cultures, on the one hand, and convergence, on the other, [which] set in motion contradictory movements between singularity and rapprochement in the legal systems '. 26 Section II will highlight France's exceptionalism in regulating custodial interrogation. Section III will present an opportunity to contrast this insular approach with the almost reflexive response to ECtHR jurisprudence. Finally, Section IV will identify important signs of local resistance to cosmopolitan pressures to move in a 23 W. Twining, 'Cosmopolitan Legal Studies ' (2002) more adversarial direction. In this way, it will be argued that, despite appearances to the contrary, we might still be a long way from witnessing the emergence of cosmopolitan legal systems that spontaneously engage in constructive dialogue with foreign legal cultures and international law.
II FRENCH EXCEPTIONALISM
Lawyers can historically be regarded as personae non gratae at police stations in France, and the right to silence is an illusion. The historical review that follows will provide evidence for this. 27 Examples from foreign and international law will support a diagnosis of considerable pre-April 14 th exceptionalism in this area.
Custodial Legal Assistance and Notification of the Right to Silence Prior to the Law of 14 April 2011
Suspects in France first obtained the right to consult a lawyer during the garde à vue with the Law of 4 January 1993. 28 Introduced by a Socialist government, this legislation gave suspects the right to request a meeting with a lawyer, lasting a maximum of thirty minutes, from the beginning of the garde à vue. 29 This consisted in a small revolution, according to no less an authority than the Minister of Justice at the time. 30 However, despite breaking with the past, it is hard to see how the embryonic right, which had inherited the inquisitorial legacy of non-interference with the power of the police to conduct interrogations, could be conceived as anything more than a reserved move towards recognizing a limited role for lawyers in custodial interrogation. In any case, the Commission Justice pénale et droits de l'homme had proposed a much more progressive solution. Chaired by the eminent comparatist Mireille Delmas-Marty, the Commission looked into custodial interrogation legislation in a number of common law and civil law countries, 31 the right to be continuously assisted by a lawyer during questioning, and that the lawyer should be able to ask questions and permanently access the investigation dossier.
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However, consultation at the beginning of the garde à vue was already seen as going too far in an adversarial direction. Thus, when a government of the Right came into power, only three months after this legislation was enacted, it voted the Law of 24 August 1993 34 , which moved the first meeting with a lawyer to 20 hours into the garde à vue 35 and created exceptional regimes of garde à vue, barring suspects' access to a lawyer for 36 hours in cases of organized crime and 72 hours in cases relating more specifically to terrorism and drug-related offences.
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The political ping-pong did not end there. A Socialist government introduced the loi sur la présomption d'innocence ('Law of the presumption of innocence') in June 2000. 37 This reform was orientated towards protecting suspects' rights; recognizing the right to meet with a lawyer from the outset of the garde à vue was an important pillar in the effort to achieve this. 38 More precisely, the new regime provided for thirty-minute meetings at the beginning of the garde à vue and then 20 hours into the process, as well as 36 hours after the beginning of the garde à vue, in cases where the latter would be extended beyond the 24-hour time limit. Outside these short periods of time, however, lawyers would not be allowed to meet their client. They would have no access to the investigation dossier either, even though they would be informed of the presumed date and nature of the suspected offence. From this point of view, it is hard to imagine how one would disagree with the view that the lawyer's intervention in the garde à vue was of limited legal significance under this legislation, consisting in nothing more than an opportunity to offer psychological support, 'reassure the interested party by explaining to him what, eventually, awaits him'. 39 The 2000 legislation also maintained the exceptional regimes of garde à vue, which is further proof of the quite mitigated effect it has had upon the inquisitorial character of the latter. Nevertheless, this legislation was met with great scepticism, mainly on the part of the police, but in some academic circles as well. 40 33 Ibid., at 113. In Continental legal systems, documents relating to police investigation and interrogation are typically concentrated on an 'investigation dossier' that is freely accessible by the parties throughout the pre-trial stage of the criminal process. 34 Loi n° 93-1013 du 24 août 1993 modifiant la loi n° 93-2 du 4 janvier 1993 portant réforme de la procédure pénale. 35 Art 63-4 CPP modified by the Law of 24 August 1993. 36 Art 63-4 CPP. The circular of the August legislation characteristically explained that 'the efficiency of the repressive apparatus' had to be guaranteed. See JORF n°196 du 25 août 1993, Circulaire du 24 août 1993 relative à la loi n° 93-1013 modifiant la loi n° 93-2 du 4 janvier 1993 portant réforme de la procédure pénale. Despite all this, the 2000 legislation represented, until the April 2011 reforms at least, the 'high point in the legislation of due process protections'. 41 Supposing that this was indeed the liberal era of criminal procedure reforms, 9/11 and its aftermath marked its end. With respect to custodial legal assistance, legislation introduced in 2004 now allowed for a second meeting between the suspect and his lawyer only at the beginning of the extension of a garde à vue beyond the 24-hour time limit. 42 This meant that there would be no opportunity for a second meeting in cases where the interrogation would be terminated before the expiry of that limit. Furthermore, in relation to organized crime offences, the time of the first meeting was moved to 48 hours into the garde à vue, with a second meeting 72 hours into it, while in relation to terrorist and drug-related offences, the suspect would have no access to counsel before a whole 72 hours had passed. 43 The 2004 legislation constituted an important axis in France's fight against terrorism after 9/11. The changes it brought to access to legal advice must therefore be seen through the prism of the securitarian obsession that characterized France in that period. 44 We have seen that since the beginning of the 1990s much ink has been spilt over the exact moment in which the lawyer should intervene in the garde à vue, and yet, until the Law of 14 April 2011, progress in this area had been marginal. 'One step forward, two steps back' epitomizes the effect of successive legal reforms. The same can be said of developments concerning notification of the right to silence. First of all, it was only in 2000 that a caution was enacted into positive law; for the first time police officers had to inform a suspect, immediately upon detention, that he had 'the right not to respond to the questions that [would] be posed to him by the investigators'. 45 In the eyes of an academic commentator, this was 'a highly symbolic move'. 46 The right had previously only been based on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 47 but it was now being incorporated into the Code of Penal Procedure. 48 At the same time, there were strong reservations about this reform. They were first mirrored in a Ministry of Justice circular, 49 which explained that the right should not be 'understood as enabling the suspect to put an end to his interrogation' and that 'a first refusal to speak [would] evidently not prohibit investigators from continuing to ask all the questions that might appear necessary to them'. 50 Reservations turned into uneasiness first, dislike later, as the pendulum swung from the liberty-and rightscentred debates that were central to the 2000 legislation to a post-9/11 environment where preoccupations with security and law and order dominated the political agenda.
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This led to the amendment of the wording of the caution in March 2002. Remaining silent would now be presented as only one of different options available to the suspect, who would be informed that he could 'make a statement, answer the questions posed to him or remain silent'.
52 Not many will disagree that a caution of this type demonstrates little enthusiasm for the exercise of the right. Just in case there are any doubts, the relevant Law circular should cause them to evaporate. It clarified that 'the right not to respond to questions posed by the investigators [should] not be perceived by persons subjected to the garde à vue as an incitement to remain silent'.
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These changes were implemented by a Socialist government that had introduced the notification duty in much stronger terms only two years earlier. A new government of the Right with a strong focus on security and public order 54 then gave the right to silence the final blow, with legislation passed in March 2003, mainly as a result of pressures exercised by magistrates and the police. 55 This legislation removed the duty to notify suspects of their right to remain silent altogether. In less than three years, France had thus gone from finally obliging the police to notify suspects of their right to silence to compromising considerably its application in practice, and then to abolition.
In conclusion, until the Law of 14 April 2011, France had strongly resisted two reforms capable of enhancing the adversarial character of the garde à vue. Access to custodial legal advice and presence of counsel during questioning, on the one side, notification of the right to silence, on the other, can strengthen the informed and voluntary participation of suspects in custodial interrogation but at the same time have the potential to obstruct truth discovery. Perhaps then, from the local viewpoint of a legal system that has evolved through the years with the objective of truth discovery primarily in mind, 56 there was nothing peculiar about the resistance to these two adversarial reforms. As will be demonstrated below, however, such unbending insistence upon inquisitorialism was myopic, failing to take into account that the above two rights were fast growing in significance -not only in their traditional adversarial strongholds but also in inquisitorial fields where conditions for their fertilization were far from ideal -and that international law has progressively become suspicious of suspects' isolation and disempowerment at this crucial stage of the criminal process. 
Foreign and International Law Perspectives
Prior to the 2011 reforms, French legislation on custodial interrogation was 'a long way from satisfying European mandates', according to Matsopoulou, 57 while Lazerges spoke of an isolation of French texts and practice, and of 'a French exception', notably on the issue of lawyers' presence at the garde à vue. 58 Coming from the mouth of 'French' academics, these affirmations of French exceptionalism are highly significant. They resonate well with various comparative studies that confirm that most Anglo-American and European Continental legal systems recognize the right of suspects to see a lawyer and be notified of the right to silence.
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I have taken a closer look at a number of foreign legal systems to get a better picture of France's position on this issue at a global level, focusing on European Continental legal systems but also selecting examples from the common law and Asian legal traditions as well as two specific examples from Latin America and the Middle East. The following countries served as comparators: Canada, the United States, Argentina, Ireland, England and Wales, Scotland, Denmark, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece, Slovenia, Israel, Nigeria, South Africa, India, Japan and China. provided that accused persons would be permitted to communicate freely with their lawyer only after the initial hearing before the investigating judge. See UN Committee against Torture, Follow-up replies from the Government of Belgium to the concluding observations of the Committee against Torture, CAT/C/BEL/CO/2, 28/3/2011, para 74. 63 Above (n 1). 64 In Scotland, the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 gave suspects the right to have a private consultation with a solicitor before any questioning by a constable begins and at any other time during such questioning. In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court held that 'a suspect arrested by the police must be offered the opportunity to consult a lawyer before being interviewed ' 49 . In Belgium, the Law of 13 August 2011 gave suspects the right to meet with a lawyer for thirty minutes at the beginning of the detention period, before being questioned by the police. during questioning. More than half of the countries examined here recognize such a right. 65 By way of contrast, France was a long way from endorsing this due process centred position throughout the 1990s and the last decade; access to a lawyer is still today severely restricted when exceptional regimes of garde à vue are set in motion.
It is equally useful to investigate whether these countries afford suspects the full panoply of the above-mentioned rights. The fact that the majority of them allow suspects to exercise all three rights signifies the importance of adversarial safeguards in modern criminal procedure.
66 Some other countries recognize only two of these rights. Thus, in Canada, Germany, Ireland and Japan, suspects are entitled to consult a lawyer and be notified of their right to silence but not to have a lawyer present during interrogation, whereas in Greece and the Russian Federation, suspects can consult a lawyer and be questioned in his presence, but they are not notified of their right to silence. Suspects in India are only entitled to access to counsel, whereas China recognizes none of these rights. This was also the position in Belgium until the August 2011 legislation came into force. Against this comparative law background, French exceptionalism quickly reveals itself. Until 1993, none of these rights applied in France, while immediately prior to the 2011 reforms, suspects were only still entitled to the right to access to counsel.
At this point, it may be wise to sound a note of caution. The fact that the above countries have legislated some or all the rights examined here does not say much about how effectively they implement them in practice. Be that as it may, at least the vast majority of these countries start from the legal position that these rights must be guaranteed. In contrast, France has until recently taken a principled position that these rights do not merit protection at this phase of the criminal process, proving that it has long been out of keeping with developments in countries in its European neighbourhood and the rest of the world.
The long-term insistence on a predominantly inquisitorial model of police interrogation demonstrates that France has also been out of keeping with important developments at the level of international law, most notably the rise to pre-eminence, in international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court, of adversarial procedural guarantees taking their root at the right to fair trial. 67 The statutes of these international criminal courts have invariably provided for the suspects' right to be informed of their right to silence prior to questioning, to have legal assistance and to be questioned in the presence of counsel. 68 Furthermore, international human rights instruments have sanctioned the right to legal assistance, 69 albeit in a more cryptic manner as to its particular applications at the police interrogation stage. Human rights treaty bodies and committees have been more categorical about the obligations for 65 These are Italy, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, England and Wales, Denmark, Austria, the Russian Federation, the United States, Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina and Israel. Belgium has just introduced this right. See art 2bis of the Law of 13 August 2011. In relation to Argentina, it must be noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that suspects will only be interrogated by the investigating judge and not by the police. When suspects appear before the investigating judge, they are entitled to have a lawyer present and are informed of their right to silence. state parties stemming from this right. The Committee against Torture, for instance, has insisted that persons in police custody should have access to legal counsel from the outset of their deprivation of liberty. In its 2010 concluding observations on France, the Committee asked that the latter should take 'appropriate legislative measures to guarantee immediate access to a lawyer during police custody'. 70 In the same vein, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture has declared that 'access to a lawyer for persons in police custody should include the right to contact and to be visited by the lawyer … as well as, in principle, the right for the person concerned to have the lawyer present during interrogation'. 71 In its 2007 report to France, it was also most evident that the Committee was losing patience with the country's continued attempts to circumvent the right to consult with a lawyer. The report explained that the Committee had 'already developed in length, and for several years, the arguments in favour of access to counsel from the first hour of deprivation of liberty by law enforcement authorities, including in relation to the most serious offences'. 72 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has made similar recommendations to member states.
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At the supranational level, the European Commission's 2004 proposal for a framework decision on certain procedural rights throughout the European Union is particularly noteworthy. It contained rules aimed at reinforcing suspects' access to legal advice and notification of their rights at the police station. 74 Efforts to create common minimum standards on the rights of suspects across the EU have gained momentum more recently, with a 2009 Roadmap for procedural safeguards 75 that led to a proposal for a Directive on the right to access to lawyer and the right to communicate upon arrest. 76 The proposed Directive provides for access to a lawyer as soon as practically possible from the outset of deprivation of liberty and before the start of any questioning, 77 and for lawyers' presence and active role during questioning. 78 The Roadmap also led to the adoption of a Directive on the right to information. Article 3 of the Directive provides that member states shall ensure that suspects are provided promptly with information concerning at least certain procedural rights. The right to silence features within these rights.
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In view of the above, France's parochial attitude to police detention and interrogation cannot be easily reconciled with the idea of a fast-growing legal cosmopolitanism. The next step in this line of thinking is to take the example of France to illustrate that the growing cosmopolitanism argument may be exaggerated and that generalizations about modern legal systems' openness to each other and receptivity of international law may have to be approached with greater caution. 
III LEGAL COSMOPOLITANISM AND LEGAL REFORM
Pre-April 14 th exceptionalism does not appear to be the result of isolation from influences of foreign and international law. In addition to the many treaty body reports criticizing the garde à vue, many French research studies had exposed the gap separating indigenous custodial interrogation practices from those endorsed by foreign countries and international law. For the purposes of illustration, if we go as far back as 1991, we see that the report of the Commission Delmas-Marty had relied heavily on comparisons of custodial interrogation rules in Anglo-American and Continental legal systems. 80 Likewise, a report attached to the June 2000 legislation explained that the provisions on legal assistance aimed to 'harmonise [French] law with the legislation of the principal European countries, which [had] already [been] providing, often for several years, for the intervention of a lawyer from the beginning of the interrogation'. 81 In short, in France there was undoubtedly an awareness that the garde à vue was falling short of European and international standards giving custodial interrogation an adversarial character. The willingness to bring the garde à vue into line with such standards was apparently missing. This changed only when the ECtHR proceeded to outright rejection of certain inquisitorial traits of custodial interrogation.
In Salduz v Turkey, 82 where the applicant had been denied access to a lawyer while in police custody, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR underlined the suspect's particularly vulnerable position at the investigation stage, noting that 'in most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer' 83 and that 'early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to which the Court will have particular regard when examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination'. 84 The Court concluded that article 6(1) of the Convention requires that 'as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right', 85 and that '[t]he rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction'. 83 Salduz v. Turkey (n 1 above) para 54. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., at para 55. 86 Ibid.
In Dayanan v Turkey the Court clarified that the right to effective legal assistance requires that a suspect should be assisted by a lawyer 'as soon as he or she is taken into custody … and not only while being questioned'. 87 The Court observed that a suspect should be able to:
obtain the whole range of services specifically associated with legal assistance. In this regard, counsel has to be able to secure without restriction the fundamental aspects of that person's defence: discussion of the case, organisation of the defence, collection of evidence favourable to the accused, preparation for questioning, support of an accused in distress and checking of the conditions of detention.
88
The French solution of two thirty-minute meetings in 48 hours of interrogation, without access to the investigation dossier, could not possibly satisfy the fair trial requirements set by the ECtHR. 89 Lawyers in France were the first to take notice of this development, relying on the Court's jurisprudence to stigmatize the illegal character of the garde à vue. 90 The government's initial reaction, on the other hand, was to downplay the importance of ECtHR decisions not condemning France, though there was also recognition of the need to rethink the garde à vue. 91 However, it was the judiciary that was most influenced by the winds of change blowing from Strasbourg, as evidenced by the fact that certain jurisdictions put immediately into application the principles laid down by its jurisprudence, thus nullifying garde à vue measures in cases where suspects had not been assisted by a lawyer. 92 These were first instance or even pre-trial jurisdictions applying the ECtHR jurisprudence at a time when higher courts had not yet spoken on the issue.
This change of attitudes towards custodial interrogation coincided with the introduction in March 2010 of an a posteriori and abstract control of constitutionality, known as question prioritaire de constitutionnalité (QPC), 93 allowing for the first time individual parties to request that the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) should examine the constitutionality of legislation that may be applicable to litigation in which they are involved. The very first day the QPC came into effect, an application was made targeting a number of garde à vue provisions in the Code de procédure pénale (Code of Criminal Procedure), 94 and in a much anticipated decision, on 30 June 2010, the Conseil constitutionnel made a finding of unconstitutionality vis-à-vis each one of the provisions it had examined. 95 The Court noted in particular that a person undergoing questioning did not 'have the benefit of the effective assistance from a lawyer' 96 and that 'such a restriction on the rights of the defence [was] imposed as a general matter without any consideration of particular circumstances likely to justify it'. 97 The Court also paid attention to the fact that suspects were not being informed of their right to remain silent. 98 The ECtHR's influence is apparent in the above insistence on effective legal assistance and the rejection of restricting defence rights solely on the basis of the nature of the offence under investigation. Further proof of such influence can be found in the oral arguments before the Court that contained many references to Salduz and ECHR jurisprudence. 99 We can explore the same thought by means of a 'what if' question, asking whether the Conseil constitutionnel would have reached the same decision if Salduz had not happened. Bertrand de Lamy answered the question in the negative. As he explained, the Conseil constitutionnel suddenly struck down the garde à vue legislation, though it had previously never questioned its constitutionality, 'surely under the influence of the European Court of Human Rights'. 100 André Giudicelli even more graphically illustrated this point:
Surely, we cannot but take pleasure in [the Court's] awakening, given that until now it had never questioned the legislative texts relevant to the garde à vue … [T]his awakening is to a large extent due to a European fanfare the echoes of which have reached the windows of the Palais Royal, 101 no doubt open this end of July 2010.
102 Surprisingly, however, the Conseil constitutionnel did not proceed to repealing immediately the provisions it had just found unconstitutional, postponing giving its decision any effect until 1 July 2011, eleven months later, to allow parliament to remedy the situation in the mean time. 103 Even in this way, the decision of the Conseil 104 struck the first blow. The Court found that for the requirements of article 6 of the Convention to be satisfied, the suspect must not be questioned in the absence of his lawyer, 105 that he must be informed of the right to silence and be assisted by a lawyer from the beginning of the garde à vue, unless there are compelling reasons to restrict the right or the suspect has unequivocally waived his right, 106 and, finally, that the right to access to a lawyer cannot be restricted solely on the basis of the nature of the offence concerned. 107 In brief, taking its inspiration directly from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the Cour de cassation placed legal assistance during police questioning and notification of the right to silence at the centre of the garde à vue. However, aligning itself with the Conseil constitutionnel as well, the Court stopped short of giving immediate effect to the rules it announced, postponing their application until 1 July 2011.
These decisions were published only five days after the ECtHR, in Brusco v. France, condemned France for the first time for shortcomings of the regime of the garde à vue, in a case where the suspect had not been notified of his right to silence and had not been assisted by a lawyer until twenty hours of interrogation had passed. In line with Salduz and Dayanan, the ECtHR noted that a person subjected to a garde à vue 'has the right to be assisted by a lawyer from the beginning of this measure as well as during questioning, and this is a fortiori the case when he has not been informed by the authorities of his right to silence'. 108 This decision was a turning point for the reform of custodial interrogation à la française. Until then, ECHR case law on custodial interrogation was being dismissed by some as 'having no obligatory force upon France, which had never been condemned by the ECtHR on that subject'. 109 In any case, the Cour de cassation continued its assault on the garde à vue unabated. With its January 2011 decisions 110 the Court confirmed that the new rules on effective legal assistance would not come into effect until the deadline set by the Conseil constitutionnel had passed or new legislation had been introduced, but at the same time, it found that confessional evidence obtained in the course of the garde à vue, without the suspect benefiting from effective legal assistance, was inadmissible in trial and that this rule was going to have immediate effect. This meant that the now well-established incompatibility of the garde à vue with the ECHR was not going to be emptied of substance as a result of the suspended effect of the decision of the Conseil constitutionnel. 111 The ECtHR's grip upon the Cour de cassation is manifest here; the French conception of custodial interrogation had to give way to that now exported by the European judges. The Cour de cassation, again in a plenary session, drove that point home with its seminal decisions of April 15 th . 112 The decisions coincided with the publication of the Law of 14 April 2011, which was to take effect on June 1 st . In this instance, the Court opted for the immediate effect of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, underlining that 'the states adhering to the Convention … are held to respect the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, without waiting to be taken to it first nor to have modified their legislation'. 113 In so doing, the Cour de cassation broke loose from the influence of Conseil constitutionnel jurisprudence to give primacy to that of the ECtHR. 114 It also left the government no room to manoeuvre, forcing it to follow in its steps, as evidenced by the immediate press release of the Minister of Justice, instructing prosecutors to apply without delay the rules of the Law of April 14 th pertaining to assistance during questioning and notification of the right to silence.
Then, on May 31 st , the Cour de cassation went so far as to give its decisions full retroactive effect. The Court found violations of the right to a fair trial in four cases where suspects had been subjected to custodial interrogation prior to the coming into effect of the rules adopted by the assemblée plenière on April 15 th . The suspects had neither been notified of their right to remain silent nor been assisted by a lawyer from the beginning of the garde à vue. 115 These were remarkable decisions, especially if one considers that they had the ability to lead to thousands of measures of garde à vue being retroactively nullified. 116 Considered in the round, France's reception of Salduz and its aftermath merits special attention, particularly since it seems to discord with previous observations about French reservations towards giving effect to the European Convention. 117 The mere speed and stealth with which the Cour de cassation has attempted to transform the French garde à vue since Salduz and Dayanan, and even more so since Brusco, is testament to both the ECHR's power to transform national law and France's ability to accommodate such transformative power. It is important to note here that since the end of the 90s the Cour de cassation had been making considerable efforts to reinforce suspects' rights at the police station -mainly by developing a jurisprudence of automatic 'exclusion' of confessional evidence obtained in violation of custodial interrogation rights -, and yet, as we have seen above, it was only ECHR jurisprudence that allowed for more drastic reform in this area. This points directly to Law's increasing cosmopolitanism, especially if one takes into account that the radical reforms inspired by Strasbourg happened against the backdrop of two centuries of incremental development in the area of police interrogation in France. 118 Emphasis can be added to this observation if we take into consideration previous failed attempts to remove inquisitorial aspects of the garde à vue. We have seen that criticism of the garde à vue from within the legal system was consistently met with resistance and in the end, it was only criticism from without that made it possible to overcome such resistance and lead to considerable change. Nevertheless, attention needs to be called to the fact that it was specifically the ECtHR that mandated reform in this case, whereas criticism originating from treaty body reports or comparisons with foreign legal systems had failed to instigate any change. No attention had been paid to the more adversarial position adopted by international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court either.
The ECtHR's impact in this domain signifies cosmopolitan Law's capacity to act as a driving force for legal reform, echoing Delmas-Marty's observation that the Court 'obliges States to legislate in domains … where no one dared venture, or to shift a long-standing and subtle balance of powers'. 119 Nonetheless, caution is again required when extrapolating legal systems' cosmopolitan attitudes from the influence that Strasbourg jurisprudence may be exercising upon them. More specifically, particular weight must be attached to the ECtHR's privileged position in the international law landscape. The ECHR overrides national law in many European countries, 120 including France, 121 and these countries most of the time introduce legislative changes to accommodate the Court's findings. 122 The ECtHR is praised for its effectiveness in inspiring human rights reform; Heifer describes it as 'the crown jewel of the world's most advanced system for protecting civil and political liberties'. 123 Thus, the ECHR is 'part-and-parcel of an emergent legal cosmopolitanism'. 124 It is the human rights instrument that shapes Law's cosmopolitanism par excellence. From this point of view, it is certainly important for this case study to provide affirmation of ECHR's cosmopolitan effect on the development of national legal systems. More intriguing, however, is the fact that this study pinpoints the ECHR's impact as the sole source of cosmopolitan influences on national law. More particularly, this study demonstrates that with respect to the reform of the garde à vue, legal cosmopolitanism did not extend beyond a 'forced' importation of international law and that, contrarily, there were no signs of a 'spontaneous' importation of foreign and international law. 125 Put another way,
France was forced to legislate in this area under the weight of potential new condemnations by the ECtHR 126 rather than spontaneously opting for reform in the light of the experience of foreign legal systems or by taking into account international human rights standards, including those now embedded in international criminal procedure as well as those encapsulated by recommendations of human rights treaty bodies specifically addressing the need for reform. This approach has little resemblance to cosmopolitanism, if we perceive cosmopolitanism as the interconnection and interpenetration of different legal cultures, as a phenomenon that encompasses 'the possibility of dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others with the aim of expanding the horizons of one's own framework of meaning and prejudice '. 127 In this light, manifestations of the legal cosmopolitanism phenomenon in France can be more properly described as cosmopolitan pressures coming from outside the national legal system rather than indigenous cosmopolitan attitudes spontaneously generated from within. But pressures from outside can easily be perceived as threatening national sovereignty and national legal culture and can therefore lead to local resistance.
IV. LOCAL RESISTANCE
Salduz and its aftermath have empowered French courts to engineer a new landscape of procedural rights applying to custodial interrogation. Strasbourg's influence becomes much less visible though if one looks at the legislative process that led to the introduction of the Law of April 14 th . In fact, close scrutiny allows for two important discoveries. First, some of the adversarial rights incorporated into the garde à vue with the Law of April 14 th have been resisted throughout the process, and second, despite appearances to the contrary, this legislation is still ingrained with the inquisitorial idea that the lawyer must be limited to a passive role at this stage of the process. A number of examples illustrating these two points will be provided below.
Resistance in the Lead up to the Law of April 14 th
At the time that Salduz was decided, the President of the French Republic had just set up the Léger Commission, with the objective to undertake 'a global analysis of the state of criminal justice in France'. 128 Regarding the garde à vue, the Commission was of the opinion that lawyers' presence had to be reinforced yet did not go any further than simply recommending a second thirty-minute meeting between the lawyer and the suspect 12 hours into the interrogation. Certain members were of the view that the lawyer should be present from the beginning of the garde à vue and during questioning, but the majority feared that this would jeopardize the efficient investigation of crime.
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A few months after the publication of this report, parliament rejected a proposal for a legislative amendment that would have given suspects the right to be assisted by a lawyer when questioned by the police. 130 The proposal was explicitly drawn from Salduz and Dayanan, concluding that it was 'imperative and urgent to modify French legislation in order to conform with the right to fair trial'. 131 Other proposals going in the direction of conformity with the ECHR had the same fate. 132 The Minister of Justice had just introduced a Bill for the Reform of Criminal Procedure and parliament allegedly wanted to focus on that. 133 However, the Bill proved 'modest when compared with the more ambitious and ECtHR-inspired proposals' mentioned above. 134 It reproduced the recommendations of the Léger Commission, mainly an opportunity to meet with a lawyer for thirty minutes after 12 hours of interrogation, coupled with continuous legal assistance in questioning in cases where the garde à vue would be extended beyond the 24-hour time limit. 135 Notification of the right to silence was not included in the Bill. The Minister of Justice at the time, Michelle Alliot-Marie, explained in an interview that in drafting the Bill the Ministry had taken into account 'many decades of jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel and the ECtHR', 136 but in view of the above, one may be tempted to think that Salduz and Dayanan had escaped their attention.
The decision of the Conseil constitutionnel of July 30 th was more influential, leading to the legislative Bill that formed the basis for the Law of April 14 th . The Bill provided for legal assistance during questioning and notification of the right to silence, but it gave the Prosecutor the power to delay the lawyer's presence for 12 hours, while also maintaining the exceptional garde à vue regime applying to offences related to organized crime. 137 More worryingly, the Bill provided for the institution of a new procedure, provocatively named audition libre ('free questioning'), which would allow the police to question consenting suspects without their being entitled to any of the rights that would normally apply at the garde à vue. 138 Notwithstanding the removal of this controversial measure, 139 the Bill had a smooth passage through parliament. Nevertheless, the relevant parliamentary discussions reveal that reform of the garde à vue was not particularly welcome by members of parliament, who saw the reform as being imposed upon them as a result of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the Conseil constitutionnel and the Cour de cassation. 140 A fear of new condemnations by Strasbourg and a sense of the inevitability of the adoption of the Bill, to prevent such a development, pervaded the debates. In any case, parliament played second fiddle to the courts, in the unprecedented attack that the latter orchestrated against the inquisitorial model of custodial interrogation. Parliament's reserved attitude towards the transition to an interrogation model more consistent with adversarial principles is crystallised in the form that the Law of April 14 th has taken.
The Law of April 14 th : Putting the Brakes on the Adversarial-Orientated Rights
Recognition of the right of the suspect to 'ask that the lawyer assists him in interrogations' 141 is a major innovation of the Law of April 14 th . Once the suspect has asked for such assistance, questioning cannot be initiated in the absence of a courtappointed lawyer or a lawyer appointed by the suspect, 142 not before the expiry of a period of two hours at least. In cases where the lawyer arrives after the two hours have elapsed, the questioning has to cease, if the suspect makes such a request, to allow for a thirty-minute confidential meeting with the lawyer. 143 Lawyers can now also access the report concerning the notification of rights and the questioning of the suspect.
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In principle, the above rights should have the capacity to enhance the adversarial character of the garde à vue by creating opportunities for suspects to more actively participate in this process and to contest the officials in charge. However, these rights are subjected to a number of important exceptions, which minimize their effect on the deeply rooted inquisitorial character of the process. First of all, the Procureur de la République (the prosecutor who supervises the garde à vue) can authorize the initiation of questioning before the two-hour period has expired when the necessities of the investigation require that the suspect be immediately questioned. 145 The Procureur can also decide that the presence of the lawyer in questioning should be deferred altogether, for a period of 12 hours, and can ask the Juge des libertés et de la detention (JLD) -a judge responsible for certain coercive measures taken in the course of the garde à vue -to postpone the lawyer's presence in questioning for another 12 hours. 146 There must be compelling reasons for postponement, deriving from the particular circumstances of the case, either the need to collect or preserve evidence or the need to prevent an imminent attack upon other persons. In these cases, the Procureur or the JLD can also decide that the lawyer should not have access to the reports of the questioning of the suspect. 147 Furthermore, the lawyer can take notes during the interview 148 but cannot ask any questions before the police have finished interviewing the suspect. 149 The lawyer can be blocked from asking questions even at the end of the interview if his questions are capable of damaging the investigation. 150 This means that, in reality, lawyers are restricted to providing psychological support and perhaps raising awareness of the right to silence. Granted this, it is difficult to argue that the Law of April 14 th allows suspects to obtain the whole range of services specifically associated with legal assistance as mandated by Dayanan. 151 This is a fortiori the case in relation to organized crime offences, where the lawyer's intervention can be delayed for 48 hours, and in relation to terrorism and drug trafficking, where the lawyer can be excluded from the interrogation for a whole 72 hours. 152 On the other hand, a positive influence of Salduz is that the above exceptional regimes can no longer be set in motion automatically on the sole basis of the type of the offence in question but rather only when there exist compelling reasons in the light of the particular circumstances of each case. 153 Finally, the Law of April 14 th added an important evidentiary rule to the preliminary article (article préliminaire) of the Code of criminal procedure. It provides that 'no conviction can be pronounced against a person on the sole basis of statements made without having been able to consult with a lawyer and be assisted by him'. 154 At face value, this rule protects against basing a conviction on potentially unreliable confessional evidence obtained in violation of a fundamental right of the suspect. However, this is true only to the extent that there is no additional corroborating evidence. If there is, then this rule's effect is to allow the use of the confessional evidence. An amendment to this rule that would have seen the word sole removed, turning the corroboration rule into an automatic exclusionary rule, gave rise to a vivid debate in parliament, which, however, decided to retain the rule in its original form. 155 On the issue of notification of the right to silence, it suffices to note that the Law of April 14 th re-introduced the wording that was in place between 2002 and 2003; police officers have to immediately inform a suspect subjected to a garde à vue that he has the right to 'make a statement, answer the questions posed to him or remain silent'. 156 The reluctance of the legislator to place the emphasis on the right to remain silent is quite obvious here; talking to the police -and risking selfincrimination -is put on an equal footing with exercising the fundamental right to remain silent.
The above provisions clearly demonstrate that the garde à vue remains ingrained with the inquisitorial logic. The rejection of adversarialism was nowhere more evident than in the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel of 18 November 2011. Faced with a question prioritaire de constitutionnalité 157 that challenged certain aspects of the regime of police interrogation instituted with the Law of April 14 th , the Court accepted that the need to reinforce defence rights did not impose that police interrogation should be conducted in a way that allows for adversarial confrontation (débat contradictoire). 158 In upholding the constitutionality of various provisions limiting the lawyer's role in the garde à vue, the Court placed emphasis on the fact that the new legislative framework provided for notification of the right to silence and for lawyers to be present during the questioning of the suspect and that it prohibited basing convictions solely on confessions obtained in the absence of legal assistance.
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In brief, it appears that, even with little room for manoeuvre, the executive and legislature still mounted considerable resistance to external pressures for reform and that the judiciary, the Conseil constitutionnel in this case, accommodated such resistance.
Why Resistance?
For France's dogmatic attachment to a model of custodial interrogation rooted in the inquisitorial tradition, a plethora of diverse explanations can be suggested. A number of them underlie the analysis in Section II; the historic continuity of lawyers' absence from the pre-trial process coupled with an obsession with confessional evidence (culture de l'aveu), for example, or the extreme politicization of the debate on suspects' rights, especially against the background of post-9/11 security dominated political agendas. Other possible explanations may touch upon the characteristics of inquisitorial criminal procedure, for example the conception of truth discovery as 'the quintessential goal of inquisitorial justice' 160 or, more particularly, the emphasis on trusting the capacity of the State 'to pursue truth unprompted by partisan pressures of individual self-interest'. 161 Institutional factors cannot figure less prominently in a list of possible explanations for the reluctance to endorse a more adversarial approach. Hodgson's work is a testament to this, as can be summed up in her observation that French criminal justice 'is a system which structurally and ideologically excludes the defence'. 162 Perhaps efforts to explain resistance could also collapse into the simplistic thesis that the police want less intervention in their work, while lawyers want to intervene more. But since this thesis would not be idiosyncratic of Franceintuitively we would expect this to be true of the police and lawyers everywhere, irrespective of jurisdiction -it would fail to explain why France in particular, in contrast for example with most other European countries, has for so long failed to recognise a role for lawyers at the police station.
From this perspective, it is interesting to note that, if one concentrates on the debates in parliament, legal nationalism also emerges as a possible source of resistance of the inquisitorial ideal against the pressures for reform coming from outside. We can take the example of Philippe Goujon MP, whose comments echo a particular discontent with Strasbourg's impact on French criminal procedure:
Everything happened as a result of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which is without doubt influenced by Anglo-Saxon law. Perhaps we were wrong not to advance the principles of our Law within the international institutions. Here we are now, forced to tack on the inquisitorial procedure that applies in France mechanisms for the protection of civil liberties adapted to an adversarial procedure, which is causing great difficulties. 163 In the same vein, Michel Mercier, the Minister of Justice who brought the April 14 th legislation to parliament, reflecting on developments that he interpreted as movements towards the construction of a European criminal procedure, sounded a note of caution, insisting that the 'reform [had] to maintain a French character, since justice, which is always an expression of culture, [could] not be tacked on from outside'. 164 Then again the European framework often becomes the last bastion of French resistance against reforms that find their inspiration in principles of adversarial criminal procedure. Movements away from the inquisitorial ideal are interpreted as movements towards the ECHR-inspired principle of contradictoire rather than a shift towards adversarialism, and suspects' rights are seen as engineered to facilitate informed participation rather than adversarial confrontation. 165 This was a recurrent theme in the debates surrounding the 1993 and 2000 garde à vue reforms that strengthened defence rights 166 and was equally present in the parliamentary debates that preceded the Law of April 14 th . 167 For a legal system heavily invested in its inquisitorially rooted pre-trial arrangements, it is arguably very difficult to admit to adversarial reforms that have the potential to unsettle -or to be seen to unsettle -such arrangements, hence the preference for the principle of contradictoire, which can be far more easily accommodated, due to being seen as a compromise of inquisitorial and adversarial criminal justice principles rather than as a pure reflection of the latter.
The above resonate well with Summers's thoughts on legal nationalism, that 'it is perhaps inevitable that criminal law and procedure, which until recently have been situated (trapped?) within the geographical and territorial confines of the nation state, should be closely identified with, and influenced by, that state' and that the indifference towards and mistrust of other criminal justice systems that this nationalism generates can hinder reform or help protect the identity of the national legal system, depending on the perspective one takes. 168 This seems to be a fortiori 163 Commission des lois constitutionnelles (n 126 above) 13. 164 Ibid., at 22. 165 For a thesis that focuses on the European construction of procedural rights as a means to enhance participation see J. the case at a time of globalization, if we accept that globalization can breed nationalism.
V CONCLUSION
The contextual inquiry undertaken in this paper casts a shadow on legal cosmopolitanism's easily assumed ubiquity, especially if cosmopolitanism is defined broadly as a capacity to interact with foreign and international law, free from the parochial limitations inherent in national legal systems. Pre-April 14 th French exceptionalism in the area of custodial interrogation pinpoints a legal system that had become rigid, isolated and immune to external influences detracting from the inquisitorial model, thus exhibiting a considerable lack of cosmopolitan vision.
On the other hand, this inquiry also demonstrates that legal cosmopolitanism can be a powerful force for legal reform, as evidenced by the dramatic effect that Strasbourg jurisprudence has had upon the modern transformations of the garde à vue. Strasbourg's influence is particularly noteworthy given the importance of current debates, on the ECtHR's growing impact on national sovereignty and national legal culture, notably in relation to criminal justice matters that are 'usually seen as very much a quintessential part of national sovereignty'. 170 The ECHR's binding force and special place within the European legal landscape explain why it constitutes the most characteristic expression of Law's growing cosmopolitanism at the European level. The more crucial and troubling question then is whether Law's cosmopolitanism also manifests itself outside this context. France's exceptionalism in the area of custodial interrogation until the moment that the ECtHR took action provides the example of a country where this has evidently not been the case. 171 To stay with the point, it is also intriguing to observe how the impact of external cosmopolitan influences may fluctuate depending on the institution that is at the receiving end. In relation to the Law of April 14 th , the judiciary has been quick to translate ECHR jurisprudence into a true driving force for reform. Strasbourg's influence has been much less felt by the executive and the legislature, which obstructed full departure from the inquisitorial paradigm. 172 The above analysis also indicates how legal cosmopolitanism goes hand in hand with local resistance. Openness to other legal cultures and receptivity of international influences can simultaneously generate resistance and insularity, often encapsulated in the idea of a defence of national legal culture. This paper provides ample evidence of this, thus resonating with globalization theories that explore the very complex, and often contradictory, ways in which the global interacts with the local and which accept that the global does not necessarily minimize the importance of the local. 173 This paper also offers an illustration of the fact that '[g]lobalisation processes do not only favour cultural interconnectedness, they favour cultural disconnectedness as well' 174 and that '[g]lobalisation involves diversity as well as uniformity, the local as well as the global'. 175 From this angle, this paper agrees with David Nelken that 'the local sense of any given global initiative needs to be carefully deconstructed'. 176 The legal cosmopolitanism-local resistance duality leads to a final thought that could give birth to a further line of inquiry. In a discussion of legal cosmopolitanism, Paul Roberts underlined the 'significance of quotidian demands of local conditions 'on the ground' ', considering that their interaction with internationalism's homogenizing pressures can 'perpetuate, and indeed reinvigorate and extend the diversity and distinctiveness of national legal cultures'. 177 Now, in the light of the analysis of local resistance in France, we can reflect on the conditions required to facilitate and optimize this process of diversification and preservation of national legal culture that would not go against Law's growing cosmopolitanism. As is evident in this paper, local resistance can be a conservative force if it takes its roots solely in legal nationalism, tradition or the interests of members of particular legal professions, all the more so when the law resisted consists of human rights standards that are universalistic in nature and, consequently, much less affected by nation state particularities than most other domains of law. In addition, it is logical that the more power to initiate legal reform is given to international and transnational law institutions, the more the likelihood for resistance increases. Legal reform in such cases appears in the eyes of the nation state as being 'imposed' from above, an attack on national sovereignty, hence the increased likelihood for resistance as opposed to a scenario where the need for reform would have been recognized from inside.
In view of the above, for the interaction between cosmopolitanism and resistance to produce the positive effect described by Roberts, it is instructive to ask whether legal cosmopolitanism can go beyond mere domestication of international law to find accommodation within the legal system itself. Put another way, we need to consider what needs to be done for legal systems to start using the full spectrum of the institutional sources of law; what needs to be done so that, in addition to looking upwards to public international law -as French courts have done in this case, with admirable results -, legal systems also start looking outwards and sideways to foreign legal systems and the possibilities of engaging in a true dialogue with them. 178 A renewed emphasis on comparative law and comparative legal studies, as a means to generate genuine interest from within national legal systems for the solutions adopted in foreign legal cultures and international legal orders, may then have a lot to commend it as the appropriate way forward towards truly cosmopolitan legal systems, considering in particular comparative law's dual function; its ability to contribute to integration, by making it possible to bypass divergence through
